Futile Pursuits of Metonymic Targets in Political and Legal Contexts by Twardzisz, Piotr
Linguistik online 65, 3/14 −  http://dx.doi.org/10.13092/lo.65.1405 
licensed under CC 3.0 
Futile Pursuits of Metonymic Targets in Political and Legal 
Contexts 




This article explores problematic aspects of metonymic target identification in specialist 
language. Searching for and establishing metonymic targets has been the goal of numerous 
studies pursued in cognitive linguistics. Not infrequently, one may get the impression that the 
deliberate refinement of the metonymic reference point, geared to bring in more semantic 
precision, leads to confusing and inconsistent results. In this article, the focus will be on 
unveiling such confusing and inconsistent cases of metonymic target identification in political 
and legal contexts. For this purpose, three case studies will be analysed. In one of these, it will 
be shown how the interlocutors deliberately play with reference points/targets for rhetorical 
purposes. In another case, an example of target identification will be reviewed in which the 
linguist/researcher arbitrarily proposes metonymic targets. As a third example, a case of 
metonymic target identification in a legal document will be reviewed. A closer look at the co-
referring entities, the major players in this document, reveals an error made by the drafters. 
This case is illustrative of a certain erroneousness underlying the assumption of 





1 Introduction: Who needs a metonymic target? 
Research in conceptual metonymy has mostly relied on and benefited from studies of possible 
interactions between metonymy and metaphor. The two conceptions have been typically 
referred to either as separate cognitive mechanisms (see, for example, Croft 1993: 336; 
Feyaerts 2000; Panther/Thornburg 2002: 283; Warren 2002; Croft/Cruse 2005: 193; and 
others) or as a continuum of largely uniform cognitive processes (see, for example, Barcelona 
2000: 53; Radden 2000: 93; White/Herrera 2003: 279; and others). Neither approach helps to 
solve the puzzling status of conceptual metonymy vis-à-vis conceptual metaphor. Both 
approaches multiply cases which are either "closer to the metonymy end or the metaphor end 
of the metonymy-metaphor continuum" (Radden 2000: 93) or are simply "notoriously 
difficult" to distinguish (cf. ibd., 2002: 408).1 
In earlier accounts, metonymy was claimed to rely on the substitution of the name of one 
thing for that of another, represented by means of the "x stands for y" schema (see, for 
example, Kövecses/Radden 1998: 38; Panther/Thornburg 2004: 95). The above schema, or its 
alternative stand-for label, can also be found in contemporary cognitive studies of 
metonymy.2 In traditional accounts, metonymy takes place between two entities which are 
contiguous, where one of such entities refers to the other entity (cf. Nunberg 1978). As a 
figure of speech, metonymy has been assumed to involve mere shifts in or transfers of 
                                                
1 For similar conclusions, see also Barcelona (2002a: 232) and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez/Díez Velasco (2002: 
489).  
2 See Gibbs's (1999: 65) discussion of Wall Street as standing for "salient institutions located at that place". 
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meaning (see, for example, Ullmann 1957: 232, 1962: 218; Radden/Kövecses 1999: 19; 
Feyaerts 2000: 64; Deignan 2005: 55). 
Cognitive linguistics has taken a different angle on metonymy. No longer viewed as a figure 
of speech, metonymy has come to be recognized as more than a mere linguistic phenomenon. 
Its reliance on words solely and its substitution function have been considered largely 
inadequate (see, for example, Kövecses/Radden 1998: 38–39; Radden/Kövecses 1999: 18–19; 
Barcelona 2002b: 207; Panther/Thornburg 2004: 96). Cognitive linguistics has naturally 
accommodated metonymy as a conceptual phenomenon (cf. Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 39). 
Metonymy, as a cognitive process, has been claimed to operate within an idealized cognitive 
model (ICM) (cf. Lakoff 1987: 68–90). As opposed to conceptual metaphor, dependent on 
two separate domains, conceptual metonymy is believed to operate within one domain only. 
The priority of the conceptual aspect of metonymy over its linguistic aspect has been 
frequently stressed (see, for example, Feyaerts 2000: 59; Panther/Thornburg 2004: 92). In 
order to conceptualize one thing in terms of another, the reference point/source is claimed to 
provide mental access or direct attention to its target (see, for example, Kövecses 2002: 144). 
The metonymic target corresponds to the entity to which the conceptualizer's attention is 
mentally directed. Put another way, the metonymic target is an associated entity referred to 
indirectly via direct reference to an entity that evokes it.  
Non-specialist accounts have repeated the by-now classic examples of metonymic patterns: 
'part > whole', 'whole > part', 'human > non-human', 'concrete > abstract', 'visible > non-
visible', etc. (cf. Langacker 1993: 29–30). These patterns further solidify the classic but fairly 
loose assumption of metonymic contiguity re-employed in Nunberg's (1978) referring 
function, as in The kettle's boiling (cf. Taylor 2002: 324). Langacker's (1993: 30) proposal 
that "metonymy is basically a reference-point phenomenon" seems to be confirmed by a string 
of examples taken from every-day speech (e. g., My pencil broke, He has a cigarette in his 
mouth, illustrating the 'whole > part' metonymic pattern). Cases like these do underline the 
priority of the reference point over its target(s). (My) pencil, (a) cigarette, (the) kettle, etc. are 
entities designated by metonymic expressions serving as reference points. Being reference 
points, these entities should afford "mental access to the desired target (i. e., the entity 
actually being referred to)" (ibd.). However, it is not certain at all what the desired targets of 
these reference points are. Worse still, it is not clear whether there have to be any (desired) 
targets of these reference points at all. The same objection can be raised with respect to more 
technical (or professional/vocational) metonymic uses. The classic example:  
(1) The {vasectomy/herniated disk} in 304 needs a sleeping pill. [one nurse to another in a 
hospital] (Langacker 1993: 29, example 26c)  
illustrates a somewhat different association than that involved in a part-whole relationship. 
The vasectomy (or herniated disk) in a hospital scenario serves as the reference point for its 
desired target, i. e., the respective patient. However, one may wonder whether in this scenario 
there is a desired or intended target at all while the expression is being uttered and/or 
processed. In other words, is the vasectomy not the reference point and the intended target at 
the same time? While the herniated disk may name an entity that is salient and easily coded, it 
does not have to necessarily evoke "a target that is either of lesser interest or harder to name" 
(Langacker 1993: 30). In fact, the patient's potential surname (e. g., Smith) may be much 
easier to name than the medical term designating his/her medical condition. Relative as it is, 
the cognitive salience ascribed to the metonymic reference point seems to play an essential 
(though not exclusive) role in its choice over other potential candidates. Another classic 
example from a different professional/vocational scenario: 
(2) The pork chop left without paying. (Taylor 2002: 325) 
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seems to confirm the above stipulation about the greater cognitive salience of the name of the 
meal ordered than the cumbersome description of the customer in a restaurant scenario. 
However, what is uncertain here is the need for maintaining any desired target that makes the 
reference point more accurate. It appears that in the speech scenarios in (1) and (2) no further 
accuracy is required by the speakers involved. The sentences in (1) and (2) are comprehended 
with sufficient accuracy as the nouns corresponding to the reference points are detailed 
enough. 
Problems with identifying metonymic targets appear only when entities other than reference 
points are in need of identifying. I submit that such identification problems do not appear 
under normal circumstances. The need to bring in more precision and to refine the reference 
point arises when extra circumstances are created for the deliberate pursuit of target 
identification. In typical speech scenarios, there is no need to further elaborate the entity 
named in a given expression. People directly involved in a speech act hardly ever pursue more 
precise targets when communicating their messages. In the course of this article, I will discuss 
three cases. First, three short dialogues will be analysed in which the actual speakers 
deliberately play with reference points/targets for rhetorical purposes. Second, a case of target 
identification will be reviewed in which the linguist/researcher arbitrarily proposes 
metonymic targets. Third, a special case of metonymic target identification in legal language 
will be considered. A legal document, such as an international legal agreement, should 
rigorously identify its parties. A detailed analysis of the co-referring entities, the major 
players in this document, shows an error made by the drafters. At the same time, this case 
demonstrates a certain erroneousness underlying the assumption of straightforward and 
automatic target identification. In conclusion, the article makes the point that metonymic 
target identification is a far more complex issue than is usually believed.  
 
2 Toying with metonymic targets in political contexts 
In this section, our discussion will focus on the deliberate choice of a reference point/target 
made by interlocutors in political contexts. The entity named by each speaker represents a 
different level of semantic specification. The reason for doing this is either purely rhetorical 
or political. Let us review three short dialogue exchanges below. 
• Dialogue 13 
A:  The director of a Foreign Office department submitted to the President… 
B:  With all due respect for department directors, it is not for a department director  
 to submit documents to the President.  
A:  I meant…to the President's Chancellery… 
• Dialogue 24 
Journalist:   You didn't know what Poland's position was...?  
President Kaczynski:  Not Poland's position, but the position of the Polish government.  
• Dialogue 35 
A: So, you recorded the conversation... 
B: I didn't. The camcorder did. 
In dialogue 1, the reference point amended is the President. The level of semantic 
specification is not sufficient for speaker B. He finds it important to point out that department 
directors at the Foreign Office do not have direct access to the President. As the interchange is 
                                                
3 24 Hours, TVN, 7 April 2009, 9 p.m. 
4 Press conference after the EU Summit in Strasburg, TVN, 5 April 2009, 7 p.m.  
5 Press conference, TVN24, 23 July 2012, 2 p.m. 
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made by members of two opposing parties, one forming the government and the other 
supporting the President, it is evident that political motivation is behind the amendment. The 
fine-tuning of the reference point the President to the President's Chancellery aims at 
reducing the importance of the opposition. In dialogue 2, the entity Poland has initially been 
selected as the reference point for sufficient comprehension. In response, President Kaczyński 
deliberately swaps Poland with the Polish government. In this way, the President, who 
distances himself from decisions made by the Polish government, differentiates the two 
positions. Undoubtedly, the motivation behind this shift is political. In dialogue 3, a purely 
rhetorical ploy to shift the listener's attention from the actual doer to the instrument in his 
hands is applied. The reason for this shift is the removal or reduction of responsibility borne 
by the actual doer. With some imagination, a further shift may be performed if need be. One 
can continue this shifting of attention and propose that the recording was carried out by the 
record button on the camcorder, and so on. The deliberately selected target becomes the 
reference point for a further deliberately assigned target.  
In the situations sketched above, the entities the President, Poland and you/I are sufficiently 
salient and easily coded for communication purposes. Therefore, they function as the 
metonymic reference points. Understood as metonymic reference points, they "evoke – 
essentially automatically – a target that is either of lesser interest or harder to name" 
(Langacker 1993: 30). The question that can be raised is whether they indeed (automatically) 
evoke the respective targets. The entities the President's Chancellery, the Polish government, 
and the camcorder are either of lesser interest or harder to name, though the degree of 
salience is relative. The point is that these targets are not necessarily evoked, automatically or 
otherwise. Rather than evoked, a different target is imposed by each interlocutor in a 
deliberate attempt to shift attention to some other entity.  
The cognitive view of metonymy holds it to reside "in the possibility of establishing 
connections between entities which co-occur within a given conceptual structure" (Taylor 
2002: 325). As opposed to the view of metonymy expressed by traditional rhetoric, the two 
entities, the reference point and its target, are not contiguous only spatially. The reference 
point provides mental access to its target(s). Given this, the entity the President provides 
mental access to the President's Chancellery, Poland to the Polish government, and you/I to 
the camcorder. One cannot deny the existence of some relationship between the members of 
their respective pairs, but that does not necessitate the provision of access by the former to the 
latter, respectively. There is a conventional relationship between the name of a state (Poland) 
and its government (the Polish government). However, in the other two cases, the relationship 
is rather loose and far from automatically established. The President's Chancellery and the 
camcorder have been deliberately invoked in these dialogues, rather than automatically 
evoked, because one of the interlocutors thought them suitable in the circumstances.  
The choice of the above targets for the reference points initially used does not confirm the 
assumption of the "efficient reconciliation of two conflicting factors", made in Langacker 
(1993: 30). The idea of an efficient reconciliation presumably works in some cases. 
Metonymy's reconciliation capability concerns bringing together "the need to be accurate" 
with being explicit "about those entities that have the greatest cognitive salience for us" (ibd.). 
However, in the above dialogues, one can hardly talk of making sure "that the addressee's 
attention is directed to the intended target" (ibd.), on the one hand, and of naming the most 
salient entity, on the other. Rather than reconciliation between the two strands of metonymy, 
we have a case of the bifurcation of goals. Each interlocutor is explicit about the entity that 
has the greatest cognitive salience for him on a given occasion.  
The above-discussed cases illustrate the point made earlier, namely, that difficulties with 
identifying metonymic targets become apparent when entities other than reference points are 
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deliberately invoked. Clearly, the reference points provided are not satisfactory for one of the 
interlocutors who elects to provide a further entity. There is no doubt that political 
circumstances have ushered in the need to bring in more precision and to deliberately refine 
the reference points given. One can predict that if no such extra political motivations were 
evident, there would be no need to further elaborate the entities originally named. It can be 
easily imagined that the initial reference points (the President, Poland, and you/I) are 
sufficient in their accuracy and salience. The pursuit of more precise entities is deliberate and 
purely rhetorical or political.  
Besides clearly rhetorical and political motivations, the vast majority of concerns over 
metonymic target identification lies in the area of metonymy research itself. The metonymy 
researcher is a major stake holder in the pursuit of metonymic targets. Thus, a large part of 
contemporary metonymy research has focused on identifying metonymic targets. The 
following section deals with this topic. 
 
3 Arbitrariness in metonymic target identification 
Metonymic relationships are claimed to involve two entities, one more and the other less 
salient conceptually. Despite some disagreement over which of the two metonymic entities is 
more salient,6 it is the identification of the metonymic target that has dominated much of 
current metonymy research. Several studies have focused on the identification of possible 
targets in the domain of domestic politics and international relations. 
Most commonly analysed proper names such as Washington, the US, Wall Street, and a few 
others, are assumed to provide mental access to other entities, usually understood to be less 
salient. For instance, the name of the capital city Washington constitutes the reference point 
within "the common domain of the capital city of the United States" (Barcelona 2002a: 215). 
Moreover, this domain hosts several sub-domains, such as: (1) the city itself as a location, (2) 
the political institutions located in it, and (3) the people that make the decisions in those 
political institutions (the President, the department secretaries, the senators and congressmen, 
etc.). Depending on the context, a particular sub-domain of Washington, compatible with this 
context, is highlighted. This sub-domain serves as the target of the reference point. The 
remaining sub-domains whose specifications are not compatible with the details of the 
sentence become backgrounded at the same time. 
The White House constitutes another classic example of a reference point in the domain of 
(international) politics. In this case, several targets carrying noticeable differences have been 
proposed in the literature. For example, Radden/Kövecses (1999: 27) propose that the target 
of the White House be understood as 'the executive branch of the US government'. On a 
different page, the target of the White House is assumed to be 'the American government' 
(Radden/Kövecses 1999: 28). In a different account, the target of the White House, as in the 
sentence The White House did not intervene, is claimed to be 'the US government' (Barcelona 
2002a: 237). A somewhat different target of the White House has been proposed in Ruiz de 
Mendoza Ibáñez/Díez Velasco (2002: 497–498), namely 'some officials who work in the 
White House'. Despite superficial similarities, the following targets:  
(a) 'the executive branch of the US government' 
(b) 'the US government' 
(c) 'the American government' 
(d) 'some officials who work in the White House'  
                                                
6 While for Langacker (1993), the reference point is more salient than the target, for Panther/Thornburg (2004: 
91), "the target meaning is conceptually more prominent [...] than the source meaning".  
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are sufficiently different. The target in (d) designates unspecified individuals, a group of 
officials employed in the White House. In this, it is different from the targets in (a), (b), and 
(c), which all assume a comparably similar level of semantic generalization. The targets in 
(a), (b), and (c) taken together are clearly different from the one in (d), though all four seem to 
be collapsed in one common sense. Besides some discrepancy in semantic detail between the 
targets in (a–c) and the one in (d), there is a more striking difference between the proposed 
targets in (a) and (b). Technically, "the executive branch of the US government" does not 
have to be, and is not, the same as "the US government".7 According to the information 
available on the US government's official web portal (www.usa.gov), the so-called 
government agencies are divided into: (1) federal government, (2) state government, (3) local 
government, and (4) tribal government. Accordingly, there is no single and distinguishable 
entity that can be labelled as government. 
A more intriguing difference is implied in the targets in (b) and in (c). The phrases differ only 
in the adjectival names preceding the noun government, though it may be assumed that both 
the US and American have exactly the same reference. However, there is a strong point made 
in Radden/Kövecses (1999) that the "whole thing for a part of the thing" metonymy operates 
on names such as America for the United States. The point being made is precisely as follows: 
"[i]n speaking of America when we want to refer to the United States (as part of the whole 
continent), we are making use of the WHOLE-FOR-PART metonymy […]" 
(Kövecses/Radden 1998: 50; Radden/Kövecses 1999: 31). In practice, though, it is doubtful 
whether language users, even specialists in international relations, are aware of and sensitive 
to the differences that the two names are claimed above to bear. The conceptualization of the 
American government in (c) would have to involve traversing a mental path from the 
reference point America 'continent/whole' to its target America 'name of country/part'.8  
A similar case to the one above can be seen in Wall Street. In the sentence Wall Street will 
never lose its well-deserved prestige, the proposed target is 'financial institution', according to 
Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez/Díez Velasco (2002: 512–513). The assumption is that speakers' 
knowledge of Wall Street ('financial institution') depends on their (prior) knowledge of Wall 
Street ('name of street'). However, the knowledge of Wall Street as 'a street in the southern 
section of Manhattan in New York' may not be unanimously shared by language users. In 
fact, speakers may be familiar with Wall Street as 'financial institution' without either being 
aware of its meaning as 'street' or without necessarily resorting to this meaning provided it is 
known. It is not the arbitrariness of the target 'financial institution' that is being questioned 
here. It is the necessary reference point 'street' allegedly providing mental access to 'financial 
institution' that is in doubt. The necessity of maintaining this consecutive pair of senses is 
claimed to be arbitrary here. The arbitrariness of target selection becomes more obvious when 
a second target is proposed, namely 'people (working in financial institution)', which results in 
two metonymies operating in a sequence: 'place for institution' and 'institution for people' (cf. 
Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez/Díez Velasco 2002: 513).9 So, on the one hand, the reference point 
'street' does not seem absolutely necessary for the activation of either target sense. On the 
other hand, the sequence of the two targets proposed mirrors an individual researcher's 
intuition. Thus, some arbitrariness is unavoidable when such sequences are established. 
Needless to say, if a sequence of two targets can be proposed, one may wonder whether 
another target or other targets can still be accommodated in this chain. Theoretically, 
                                                
7 More on the technical detail of '(the executive branch of) the US government' in Section 5.  
8 Elsewhere (Twardzisz 2013), I argue that the name America does not have to trigger the sense 
'continent/whole' initially, which, in turn, provides mental access to the sense 'country/part'.  
9 Similar proposals can be found in Goossens (2002: 32), where the double metonymy 'place for institution for 
people' is postulated, and in Bartsch (2002: 73), where chains of metonymic transfers are posited. 
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unlimited sequences of increasingly more fine-tuned targets can be arrived at. Individual 
researchers will make their own choices based on their own intuitions. 
Intuitive guesses seem to motivate the decisions made in the following two cases. In two 
sufficiently similar contexts, two differently identified targets have been postulated for names 
of states involved. In the sentence:  
(3) Denmark shot down the Maastricht treaty. 
the postulated target of the sentential subject Denmark is 'the voters of Denmark' (cf. Croft 
1993). In the following sentences: 
(4) (a) Germany pushed for greater quality control in beer production. 
(b) The United States banned tuna from countries using drift nets. 
(c) Myanmar executed twenty Muslim activists. 
the state names Germany, the United States, and Myanmar are claimed to refer to 'national 
governments' as the respective predicates are understood to instantiate 'the actions of national 
governments' (cf. Croft 1993: 353, 2002: 184–185). The different targets identified for the 
names in (3) and (4) are allegedly determined by the kinds of predicates involved (cf. ibd.: 
187). Thus, the predicates in (3) and (4) should be markedly different for this purpose. 
However, it is difficult to point out any essential difference between shoot down, on the one 
hand, and push, ban, and execute, on the other, in terms of their effect on the respective 
subjects. Unless sufficient semantic differences of the predicates in (3) and (4) can be 
highlighted, the two distinct targets proposed are not convincingly accounted for.  
The two different proposals of metonymic targets/senses, 'national governments' and 'the 
voters of a country', constitute only some approximation of many other possible targets. 
However, these two only are distinct enough to be puzzling. If such comparable contexts have 
generated two quite distinct targets, certainly there may be many more targets identified in 
other related contexts. Targets are selected arbitrarily and the degree of arbitrariness grows 
increasingly in political contexts. The designation of the meaning attributed to the metonymic 
target of a state name always carries an element of arbitrariness. 
 
4 Metonymy in legal contexts 
The language of the law is reputed for being precise, lexically, morphologically, syntactically, 
and semantically. However, even such a rigorous kind of discourse cannot divorce itself from 
ambiguous references. Some attention to the problem of reference is devoted in Tiersma 
(1999). One such type of reference discussed in Tiersma (1999: 121) is declaratory reference, 
by means of which one can refer to people and institutions using several different expressions. 
In legal contexts, this can cause interpretation problems (cf. Hilda Garcia the individual vs. 
Hilda Garcia as general partner in the Hilda Garcia Partnership vs. the Hilda Garcia 
Boutique). In general, the alleged precision of legal language is contradicted by Tiersma on 
numerous counts, for example, strategic or deliberate imprecision by means of the passive 
voice and nominalizations (cf. ibd.: 74–79), the use of vague language (cf. ibd.: 79–81), 
tension between flexibility and precision (cf. ibd.: 81–85).  
Metonymic relations in legal environments have been discussed particularly extensively in 
Kosecki (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). Legal language, where metonymic expressions are 
claimed to be frequent, is similar in this respect to everyday language. Despite this superficial 
similarity, metonymic expressions in legal language are claimed to fall into two categories. 
Some are thought to be harmless as not causing ambiguity in the interpretation of legal 
matters. Others "make legal provisions unclear" (Kosecki 2002: 182). An instance of a 
confusing type of conceptual metonymy is the 'institution for people responsible' metonymy, 
illustrated by 'revenue office' and its amended form 'the head of the revenue office'. Allegedly, 
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the latter removes metonymy and reduces ambiguity. While it may indeed reduce ambiguity, 
in the light of various proposals of metonymic chains (e. g., Bartsch 2002), it is doubtful if it 
removes metonymy completely. The desire to remove metonymy may be hard to fulfil, once 
metonymy is recognized as being pervasive in any type of language. Thus, the common 
expectation of removing all ambiguity by making a legal provision maximally precise in its 
naming the agency responsible for a given action may be difficult to attain in practice. It is 
unrealistic to keep legal provisions free from any ambiguity caused by ubiquitous metonymy. 
In legal agreements or contracts, it is mandatory to identify the parties to the document not 
only with maximum clarity, but without any ambiguity whatsoever. This requirement is 
perfectly in line with the general desire to keep legal acts free from ambiguity. To achieve 
such clarity when drafting legal documents, Kosecki (2002: 188) proposes to avoid the use of 
"conceptual tools which may make legal acts difficult to interpret already at the moment of 
their coming into force". It is common practice to define the parties to a legal agreement or 
contract at the beginning of the document by referring the two parties to particular 
individuals, companies, or institutions (e. g., plaintiff ~ defendant, seller ~ buyer, lessor ~ 
lessee, employer ~ employee, landlord ~ tenant, debtor ~ creditor, supplier ~ recipient, 
franchiser ~ franchisee, licensor ~ licensee, publisher ~ author, etc.). If one of the parties, or 
both, are referred to as companies or institutions, not as individual persons, it is mandatory to 
name an individual person who represents such an organization.  
It would seem that such a rigorous description of the parties to a legal agreement leaves no 
doubt over what targets these reference points provide access to. This does not have to be the 
case though. Despite the usual availability of each name to provide access to another name, 
careful examination may reveal unpredictable and, presumably, unwanted references. As 
opposed to the cases analysed in Sections 2 and 3, the case scrutinized in Section 5 does not 
display anyone's arbitrariness in target identification. Quite the opposite, the targets of the 
reference points are clearly defined as expected of legal agreements. However, the targets 
defined in the document, applied to all the contexts provided there, collide with the targets 
evoked by the recipient of the document.  
 
5 Metonymic target assignment in a legal agreement 
In this section, a peculiar case of a metonymic mismatch will be analysed. The case in 
question shows two problems. One, theoretical, is of some importance to metonymy theorists. 
The other, more practical, should concern drafters of legal documents.  
Prior to the actual analysis, let us introduce some background surrounding the document 
under consideration. On 20th August 2008 in Warsaw, the following agreement was signed: 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the 
United States of America concerning the deployment of ground-based ballistic missile defense 
interceptors in the territory of the Republic of Poland.10 
It consists of a Preamble, 16 Articles, an Annex and an Appendix in the form of a map.11 The 
sticking point in the document is the term Parties and its use with the references implied.12 
The term Parties is defined in the Preamble as:  
                                                
10 This document can be found at www.state.gov/documents/organization/180542.pdf. It was signed by 
Radosław Sikorski, Minister of Foreign Affairs (for the Government of the Republic of Poland) and 
Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State (for the Government of the United States of America). The Agreement was 
not ratified by the Obama administration and its dwindling interest in the entire missile shield project was 
signalled during the election campaign. The missile shield project was replaced with a lower-cost reliance on 
existing sea-based and land-based capabilities. 
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The Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the United States of 
America (hereafter referred to as the "Parties"). (ibd.) 
Moreover, the key players in this Agreement are referred to by means of the following terms: 
the Government of the Republic of Poland, the Government of the United States of America, 
the Republic of Poland, and the United States of America. Upon a closer analysis, it appears 
that the Agreement makes use of the above five terms each in a number of senses, some of 
them significantly overlapping with one another. If treated as metonymic occurrences, these 
five terms constitute reference points giving access to a number of targets. The term Parties 
covers two instantiations thereof. One of them is one Party (say, Party 1), which is the 
reference point for the Government of the Republic of Poland. The other is the other Party 
(Party 2), which is the Government of the United States of America. The target the 
Government of the Republic of Poland of the reference point Party 1 turns into another 
reference point whose target needs to be established. The same is true of Party 2 and its target. 
Before we elaborate on this point, let us introduce and analyse the major problem found in 
this document. 
The Agreement was made between the governments of the two states that are referred to as 
the Parties, not the states themselves. But the second sentence of the Preamble, which reads: 
Recognizing that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their 
delivery, including ballistic missiles, poses a grave threat to international peace and security, 
and to the Parties, their allies, and friends; (ibd.) 
reveals an unexpected, and supposedly, unintended scenario. If, as stated in the Preamble, the 
Parties stands for the two governments, then what about a grave threat posed to the two 
countries themselves, that is, their inhabitants, lands, property, natural resources, etc.? 
Presumably,13 the authors of the Agreement meant that weapons of mass destruction posed a 
threat also to both countries, with their citizens, etc., rather than their governments solely, 
which is what the term Parties stands for in the document. Although it is also the international 
community, allies, and friends that may be affected by the possible launching of ballistic 
missiles, the fact remains that the term Parties drastically limits its scope of reference to the 
two governments. Summing up, the Agreement is signed because the following entities are in 
danger: (1) international peace and security; (2) the Parties (to the Agreement), i. e., the 
Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the United States of America; 
and (3) their (i. e., the two governments') allies, and friends. Non-governmental, or 
government-less, parts of the two countries have been left out and exposed to a possible threat 
posed by weapons of mass destruction.  
Some questions beg answering at this initial stage. Can one assume that Poland is the 
metonymic target of the reference point the Government of the Republic of Poland? The same 
query can be made about the US with respect to the Government of the US. This is an open 
question. However, it needs to be noted that the usual metonymic direction proposed in 
metonymy studies is 'state for its government' (cf. Croft 1993: 353, 2002: 184–185; see earlier 
in Section 3), rather than 'government for its state'. Even if the legal document in question 
makes the government of a state a more salient entity than the state itself, nothing is said of 
the relationship between the two. They are not made synonymous. The two entities, the state 
and its government, can be understood as quite distinct, which is evident from Dialogue 2, in 
Section 2. Our analysis of the text of the Agreement shows that the reference to either the 
                                                                                                                                                   
11 On the foreseen military and strategic aspects of the provisions of the Agreement, see, for example, Peterson 
(2011). 
12 On names of parties as used in contracts, see, for example, Tiersma (1999: 122, 224–225).  
13 This is where the present researcher's intuition comes into play. 
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state (name) or its government is most probably purely incidental. It is hard to talk of any 
predetermined order in the choice of either type of entity.  
A cursory look at the text of the Preamble leaves no doubt over the haphazardness of the two 
types of references made. Both, the names of the two states and the references to their 
respective governments are mixed up in the Preamble. In the following passage, the use of the 
names of the two countries: 
Recognizing the applicability of the Agreement between the Republic of Poland and the United 
States of America to Supplement the NATO SOFA (hereafter referred to as the "Poland-U.S. 
Supplemental SOFA"), upon its entry into force; (Preamble) 
suggests that the two states constitute the Parties to the Agreement. The following passage, 
which makes use of the possessive adjective their, 
Recognizing also the need to combine and enhance their efforts for purposes of individual and 
collective self-defense, to maintain international peace and security, and to further enhance their 
capabilities for an appropriate response to threats and attacks, including those of a terrorist 
nature; (Preamble) 
strengthens the reference of the Parties to both states (or state names, to be more precise), 
rather than their governments. This is confirmed in the following passage: 
Reaffirming that deployment of ground-based ballistic missile defense interceptors in the 
territory of Poland represents an important contribution by the Republic of Poland to the 
building and further enhancement of the United States missile defense system; (Preamble) 
in which the names of the two countries are explicitly mentioned. This reinforces the 
impression that the states are indeed the Parties to the Agreement. This intuitive guess is aptly 
substantiated in the following passage, where international peace and security are invoked in 
the context of the states rather than their governments: 
Recognizing that cooperation with allies and friends, and including members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter referred to as "NATO"), in defense against the threat of 
ballistic missiles is important, and that deployment of United States ground-based ballistic 
missile defense interceptors in the territory of Poland will enhance and complement the existing 
security relationship between the Republic of Poland and the United States and contribute to 
international peace and security and to the security of the Republic of Poland, the United States, 
and NATO; (Preamble) 
However, the following passage of the Preamble makes the explicit mention of the term 
Parties, which unmistakably directs our attention to the states' governments again: 
Bearing in mind their common defense interests and recognizing that cooperation in the field of 
ballistic missile defense constitutes one of the elements of broader bilateral security 
cooperation, which should contribute to the strengthening of the security of the Parties; 
(Preamble) 
The above passage contains the unclear use of the possessive adjective their, whose precise 
reference is not obvious. It can refer back either to the preceding passage, where its co-
referents are the Republic of Poland, the United States, and NATO, or to the Parties, as used 
at the end of this passage. The Preamble ends with another swap in reference, when the 
explicit mention of the two state names is made:  
Recognizing that the United States intends to provide information to, and to coordinate with, the 
Republic of Poland concerning contingency planning for the security and defense of the Base; 
(Preamble) 
The main part of the Agreement is not free from further instances of mixed references and 
overlaps of the two key types of entities. At its very beginning, the document outlines the 
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following: "This Agreement establishes the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect 
to [...]" (Article I.1), with the explicit mention of the Parties. According to this clause, the 
Agreement establishes the rights and obligations of the two governments. Understandably, 
there are several explicit and uncontroversial occurrences of the terms Party/Parties, as 
exemplified below: 
The Parties shall enter into implementing arrangements [...]. [...] the Parties shall exchange 
information on (Article VII.8)  
The Parties agree to implement this Agreement (Article X.1) 
This Agreement may be terminated at any time by either Party upon a two-year written notice to 
the other Party. (Article XVI.4)  
A large part of the document is dominated by various occurrences of both names of the key 
countries, the United States and Poland, for example: 
The Base is the property of the Republic of Poland. (Article III.1) 
The United States shall have exclusive command and control over (Article IV.7) 
The Republic of Poland shall ensure that use of the land areas (Article V.6) 
The United States shall furnish relevant information (Article V.7) 
The United States shall control access to the Facility on the Base. (Article VI.4) 
The Republic of Poland shall be responsible for (Article VII.1) 
The United States shall provide to the Republic of Poland (Article IX.2) 
The United States shall have the duty to respect (Article X.2) 
The Republic of Poland confirms its policy (Article X.3) 
The United States will take prompt action (Article X.4) 
As can be expected, the use of the labels Party/Parties and the names of the actual states 
causes some confusion. The level of a state (name) is mixed with the level of the state's 
government, an example of which is given below:  
The Parties undertake to cooperate, as appropriate, with respect to intelligence and 
counter-terrorist protection of the Base. The Republic of Poland and the United States 
will carry out this cooperation through (Article VII.7) 
The second sentence above uses the names of the two countries presumably to avoid the 
repetition of the term Parties. However, the repeated use of Parties would be more consistent 
with what the Agreement sets out to organize. There are also cases that are even more 
confusing. In the following passage, the explicit use of both state names, instead of each 
Party, would be more accurate:  
This Agreement shall enter into force in accordance with the internal laws of each Party (Article 
XVI.1) 
The phrase the internal laws of each Party is probably an unfortunate wording as it is political 
states rather than governments that have internal laws. 
The use of the state names alongside the term Parties may suggest two different targets 
intended. However, the use of the state names alongside the term Parties may also suggest the 
collapsing of all these standing for one target. The document accommodates numerous such 
mixed occurrences: 
Each Party shall be responsible for the costs of carrying out its obligations (Article XIII.1)  
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Except as may be otherwise agreed, the United States shall be responsible for (Article XIII.1(a)) 
If the Parties agree that the Republic of Poland shall assist the United States in [...], the United 
States shall reimburse the Republic of Poland for (Article XIII.1(d))  
The Parties shall consult on [...]. [...] The United States will give sympathetic consideration to a 
request from the Republic of Poland (Article XIV.4)  
In order to distinguish which of the Parties is involved, the phrase the government of Poland 
or the government of the United States should be selected and appropriately used. In the 
context of a legal document such details should be particularly taken care of. Needless to say, 
should the need arise, Poland and the government of Poland, can be kept as distinct entities 
for rhetorical or political reasons (see Section 2). Other instances of mixed levels can be 
found quite easily. For instance,   
the United States shall submit to the Polish Ministry of National Defense relevant 
documentation concerning the planned construction activity. (Article V.3) 
should be re-phrased as the US Department of Defense shall..., to assure that the two 
institutions are at the same level.  
The above analysis, though far from conclusive, indicates that it is the drafters' carelessness in 
the choice of terminology and phraseology that results in a poorly composed document. 
Avoidance of repetition of the same term cannot account for the choice of a technically 
inappropriate term. What is more, the bifurcation of Parties into 'government' and 'state' 
should not be taken as a deliberate ploy on the part of the Agreement drafters to confuse the 
reader. The data reviewed above suggest insufficient attention paid to detail. 
Paradoxically, the errors in question would not have surfaced were it not for research in 
metonymic target identification. The Agreement in its present form has not attracted anyone's 
attention as far as terminological or phraseological inconsistency is concerned. Besides 
confirming the ubiquity of metonymy in legal documents, the analysis has also demonstrated 
some dose of terminological inconsistency which may lead to certain interpretational 
problems. Contrary to what the Preamble defines as the Parties to the Agreement, it is 
possible to assume that the definition 'the governments of the two countries' is a shortcut only. 
It can be assumed, as a consequence of admitting the shortcut, that the two states are indeed 
also undefined Parties. This assumption is in conflict with the rigorousness of legal 
definitions, which should accurately spell out such targets. However, even the assumption of 
(the names of) the two states as undefined targets, alongside the governments, does not dispel 
potential problems with target identification. Given that there are four acting Parties to the 
Agreement: 
(a) the Government of the Republic of Poland 
(b) the Government of the United States of America 
(c) the Republic of Poland 
(d) the United States of America 
one cannot deny significant overlap between (a) and (c), on the one hand, and (b) and (d), on 
the other. Metonymy researchers will point out that in many uses the occurrence of a state 
name is the reference point for locating its target, i.e. the government. Thus, the use of the 
two, a state (name) and its government, results in some redundancy.  
Finally, the vastly ignored issue of the ambiguity of the term government should receive some 
attention. As a specific component of the two labels the Government of the Republic of 
Poland and the Government of the United States of America, its encyclopaedic semantics is 
important for metonymic target investigation. A careful metonymic target investigation 
cannot ignore the fact that 'the government of a state' is not an ultimate target in itself, or at 
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least, it does not have to be. It should be viewed as a reference point for the location of a more 
accurate target. In brief, the Government of the Republic of Poland14 is composed of the 
prime minister and the council of 19 ministers. In the context of the Agreement, only a few 
ministers with their ministries and ministerial functionaries, notably the Ministry of National 
Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will be primary players. The others will, if at all, 
remain marginal. Given this, the Government of the Republic of Poland can be taken as the 
reference point for its more accurate components. As for the Government of the United States 
of America, the issue of metonymic targets is structurally even more complex. Terms such as 
the government of the US and the US government are used in official documents to represent, 
refer to, or stand for the federal government. The (Federal) Government of the United States, 
as defined on its official website (see Section 3), consists of three branches: the legislative 
branch, the judicial branch, and the executive branch15 (the President, the Vice-President and 
the Executive Office of the President with several offices and councils). What is more, under 
the executive branch there are 15 Executive Departments and a few dozen independent 
agencies and government corporations, as well as numerous boards, commissions, and 
committees.  
In both cases, the governments are complex organizations. When it comes to foreign policy 
activities, it is individuals such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Secretary of State that 
hold sway. But, as aptly noted in Hill (2003: 53): 
they struggle to keep control of their vast portfolio, increasingly invaded as it is by colleagues 
running other ministries, and they are always likely to be trumped by a head of government who 
decides to take a direct interest in foreign affairs. 
Undoubtedly, foreign affairs are complex and this complexity must also show in descriptions 
of international relations. Complete explicitness does not seem possible, whatever this means. 
Perhaps, the Agreement rightly appoints the two governments as the Parties to it, but the 
names of both countries are used instead throughout the text, as it is normal practice in 
foreign affairs. This seems to be confirmed in Allen (1989: 70–71), who says: 
foreign policy is an area of government activity and that, therefore, our central focus of attention 
is the state; for it is only in association with the state that we find governments. 
So, from the point of view of foreign policy makers, there is nothing wrong with using either 
government or state as a reference point almost interchangeably. This normal practice in 
foreign policy has been acknowledged in linguistics as a referring function of a name. For 
cognitive linguists, Britain wants... is the product of a mental operation in which the reference 
point Britain provides mental access to its intended sense 'government', which, in turn, 
provides mental access to another intended sense, possibly "important persons associated with 
institutions located in those places" (Taylor 2002: 324). For foreign policy specialists, Britain 
wants... is an expression whose meaning is "what officials think they can achieve" 
(Clarke/White 1989: 170) and the regular way of addressing dynamic processes in foreign 
policy. What is considered normal practice in the area of international affairs, in cognitive 
linguistics, becomes a serious issue which is hardly resolvable. In foreign policy studies, "[...] 
states or other entities can perfectly well be treated as unified actors" (Hill 2003: 51). States or 
their governments are mere linguistic abbreviations which make perfect sense when world 
affairs are addressed. 
                                                
14 An internet search of the official website of the Government of the Republic of Poland leads to 
www.premier.gov.pl/which carries the name "the Chancellery of the Prime Minister". 
15 Note that, according to the Polish Constitution, executive power is vested in the President of the Republic of 
Poland and the Council of Ministers. In short, the Polish government is what the US executive branch of the 
(federal) government is.  
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Certainly, a bilateral agreement is not the kind of document in which all individuals 
potentially involved in the implementation of the agreement's provisions should be explicitly 
spelled out. Nevertheless, pinning all possible outcomes on the government may lead to 
unwanted results. Perhaps some middle level of generality would bridge the gap between the 
concrete specification of the target and the intangible reference point. For example, the 
provisions of the Agreement might indicate the agency which will deal with a particular issue. 
The Agreement shows rudimentary traces of this trend, too few though, to be treated with 
seriousness: 
The United States shall [...] identify a representative of the United States forces [...] who shall 
be the United States single point of contact (Article IV.3) 
cooperation between relevant Polish and United States authorities (Article V.5) 
the United States shall submit to the Polish Ministry of National Defense relevant 
documentation (Article V.3) 
Provisions like the ones above are not unbearably detailed. Neither are they too general. The 
terms designating the official names of the two countries, reference points, are general enough 
to serve as cover terms for several different more concrete targets. This underspecification 
leaves some doubt over who, precisely, is tasked with these duties. However, at the same 
time, this underspecification makes the document manageable by indicating only the state 
responsible for delegating a particular duty to a specific agency or group of individuals. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Metonymy is a fact of life, certainly of language and of the discourse of international affairs. 
The present article does not argue against this fact. Both, cognitive linguists and foreign 
policy scholars acknowledge the prevalence and ubiquity of metonymy in language. What is 
more, metonymy's role in the reconciliation of two opposing forces is also acknowledged by 
scholars in both fields (e. g., Langacker 1993: 30; Hill 2003: 114). The peculiar conflict 
between the desire for accuracy to understand complexity, on the one hand, and the drive for 
manageability and focus on salient entities, on the other, is reconciled in and by metonymy. 
Metonymy per se resolves this conflict by offering some reference from a more salient to a 
less salient entity or part of a whole. There remains, however, another unresolved conflict, 
which becomes particularly acute in metonymy studies focusing on metonymic target 
identification. For language users, lay or specialist ones, it is natural to avoid excessive detail 
and to resort to the cognitively most salient features. For language theorists, the tendency is 
the opposite. Researchers in metonymy do not merely acknowledge metonymy's ubiquity and 
prevalence, but they probe much deeper in search of the intended target. As a result, the target 
established may indeed be intended by the researcher, but there is no guarantee that it is also 
intended by everyone else. Different targets proposed for almost identical reference points, 
seen in Section 3, prove this point. A target which is intended universally may not be attained, 
no matter how accurate its semantic specification is. What is more, searching for accuracy, so 
intrinsic to linguistic research, runs counter to expectations voiced outside of linguistics. 
Especially in political (non-academic) contexts, the manageability of the whole is primary 
with respect to the comprehension of quite complex detail. This attitude is expressed very 
strongly in Hill (2003: 114), who says that, "too much detail, or expertise, kills understanding 
in an over-burdened decision-maker and leads to an hostility to the 'academic' approach".  
This stance partly reflects the often-witnessed rift between practitioners and theorists in 
foreign affairs. It also is indicative of the suspicion borne by specialists in foreign policy of 
realist persuasion towards a linguistic turn16 (see, for example, Lapid 1996: 241). 
                                                
16 For a summary of the so-called "linguistification of political theory", see Twardzisz (2013: Chapter 2).  
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Explorations of potential targets of metonymic reference points are the product of intensive 
research in metonymy. Reference points corresponding to political entities are particularly 
geared for use in strenuous target identification procedures. Political contexts, suspected of 
breeding double meanings, constitute a promising area for the researcher in metonymy 
pursuing more precision and intended targets. Politically-laden terms, never accurate enough, 
are always in need of sharpening their semantics. Metonymic target identification is therefore 
particularly responsive to this need. The scholarly need to establish more precise metonymic 
targets only incidentally meets the needs of average language users. Toying with metonymic 
targets in typical speech scenarios happens only when deliberate attempts to highlight specific 
targets are made. Documents showing errors in target assignment may be re-drafted to correct 
the apparent errors. However, the errors spotted become obvious only when a painstaking 
analysis is undertaken whose goal is to identify accurate targets. It seems that at a political 
(non-linguistic) level of analysis, the document with its targets is sufficiently detailed. The 
key players enumerated in the Agreement provide enough specification for successful 
comprehension. Certainly, a detailed linguistic analysis in metonymic target identification 
will prove the opposite. 
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